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IN THE~ SUPREME COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH

EVA M. REES SCOTT,
Plaivntiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

Case No. 8968

MOLEN N. R.EES,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATE1IENT OF FACTS
On March 17, 1958, the District Court of Salt Lake
County entered a Decree of Divorce in the above entitled
case, pursuant to which defendant was awarded a decree
of divorce and a division of the property of the parties
was made (R-2).
This decree awarded the care, custody and control
of the two minor children of the parties to plaintiff during the months of September through June, inclusive,
of each year and upon alternate Thanksgiving and
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Christmas holidays, and to the defendant during the
months of July and August of each year and during the
Christmas and Thanksgiving holidays of every other
year. Defendant was ordered to pay the sum of $250.00
per month for the support of the children during the
periods of plaintiff's custody (R-2, 3).
The children are a girl, who is now six years old,
and a boy, who is now two years old (R-20).
The Decree specifically provided that in the event
plaintiff resided with the minor children outside the
jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiff was to pay the
transportation of the children to and from the place of
abode of defendant for his period of custody entitlement
(R-2, 3). It further provided that defendant would have
the privilege of reasonable visitation with the children
while they were in plaintiff's custody but his transportation in visiting the children would be at his own expense
(R-3). The Decree further provided that plaintiff could
not remove the children from the jurisdiction of the court
without first applying to the court for an order permitting the removal (R-3).
Pursuant to the decree, plaintiff had custody of the
children until July 1, 1958 and defendant had their custody from July 1st to Septe1nber 1, 1958. Since September 1, 1958 the children have been in plaintiff's custody
(R-32, 34, 35).
On June 21, 1958 the plaintiff married Dr. Edward
B. Scott, a resident of North Hollywood, California (RSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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17, 18; Ex. P-1). Since the marriage Appellant has established a home in North Hollywood, California, with
her husband, which is located in a good neighborhood and
in good surroundings for the rearing of children (R-8).
On the 29th of August, 1958, plaintiff served on defendant and his counsel and filed a motion in accordance
with the decree of divorce for permission to remove the
children to her residence in the state of California during
the period from September through June of each year.
This motion was accompanied by plaintiff's affidavit
(R-5 to 8). Defendant filed an affidavit in opposition
to this motion and the matter was heard September 9,
1958.
The evidence relative to the home and circumstances
of plaintiff and her husband is uncontradicted. It shows
that the home established by plaintiff and her husband
in California is located in close proximity to good schools
and church facilities (Exhs. P-2 to P-8; R-18, 19, 20).
The home has a bedroom for each of the children, has a
large yard in which the children can play and a patiobarbecue area (R-18). Plaintiff and her husband have
redecorated the bedroom for the little girl and Dr. Scott
constructed a sandbox area and acquired toys for the
children in anticipation of their coming to live with them
(R-21).
Plaintiff's husband desires that the children come to
reside with plaintiff and him during the period of plaintiff's custody entitlement (R-21) and he has a great
amount of affection for the children (R-8). Plaintiff
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testified that her husband continually talks about the
children and what will be in their best interests when
they reside with plaintiff and him (R-21).
The uncontroverted evidence at the hearing further
shows that were it not for her marriage to Dr. Scott,
plaintiff would be required to seek employment to provide for herself, but by reason of her marriage to Dr.
Scott this is not necessary (R-25,30). Dr. Scott has a net
income of approximately $2,000.00 per month in his
practice as an anesthesiologist on the staff of the Children's Hospital in Los Angeles, California (R-23, R-21).
By reason of this situation plaintiff will be able to devote her full attention to providing the chidren with a
mother's loving care and affection and in making a good
environment for them (R-25; R-8).
Prior to establishing residence in California, Dr.
Scott had been engaged in the practice of medicine in Salt
Lake City, Utah. Before the marriage of Plaintiff and
Dr. Scott, he had established his residence in California.
By moving to California he achieved certain very definite
advantages for himself in his profession. .Among these
were the fact that he could obtain a shorter preceptorship
in California, he has available to hiin the facilities for
intensive research in the field of hypothenny, w·hich is
the use of freezing as an anesthesia for operations, and
has the opportunity of doing a large a1nount of teaching
work in the hospital (R-24). In addition to these factors,
there was considerable uncertainty as to the future of
anesthesiologists in Utah hospitals at the time he left
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here. This arose out of a movement on the part of certain
hospitals in the region to require anesthesiologists to
work on a salary basis in the hospitals rather than permitting them to have a private practice of medicine such
as other doctors have. Dr. Scott did not want to work on
such a salary arrangement but rather was interested only
in engaging in the private practice of his specialty
(R-75).
Following the hearing the Court entered an order
denying plaintiff's motion, stating that "the remarriage
of plaintiff presents a possible unstable home situation
and time is needed in which to determine whether or not
the home of plaintiff and her new husband is suitable for
rearing the minor children of the parties." The order
further provided that plaintiff would be permitted to
re-apply for permission to remove the children frmn
the State of Utah, at any time after January 1, 1959 but
made the granting of such permission expressly conditional upon the testimony of plaintiff's new husband
being offered at that time in order that the court might
determine the fitness of the home for the children.
This appeal is taken from that order.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT ONE..
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT UNDER THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE HEARING OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMOVE HER CHILDREN TO CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S DISCRETION.
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POINT TWO
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMOVE HER CHILDREN TO THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA DURING THE PERIOD FROM
SEPTEMBER THROUGH JUNE OF EACH YEAR, IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
POINT THREE
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE FINDINGS CONTAINED THEREIN ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE HEARING OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE.
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT UNDER THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE HEARING OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMOVE HER CHILDREN TO CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S DISCRETION.

The Utah statute governing the role of the court in
connection with supplemental proceedings following divorce decrees is section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated,
1953. This provides :

" * * * Such subsequent changes or new
orders may be made by the court with respect to
the disposal of the children or the distribution of
property as shall be reasonable and proper."
Within the framework of this statute, the Courts
have construed the function of the court in connection
with custody 1natters to he that of determining what is
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in the best interests and welfare of the minor children,
and have concluded that this is a matter which rests
largely in the sound discretion of the trial court. It has
been said that the orders of the trial court will not be
upset unless there is an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.
Applying these rules to the instant case, it is submitted that by no stretch of the imagination could the
trial court's order be said to be reasonable and proper.
Rather it represents a grevious departure from realities,
disregarding the effects it will have, resulting in the
creation of a very brutal situation.
Analysis of the order shows that it does two things:
First, it leaves the custody of the children who are of
tender ages with their mother, but for the present requires that she keep them in Utah where she does not
have a home. Secondly, looking to the future, it requires
that plaintiff and her husband conduct their lives to.
gether so that some additional showing can be made that
their home life is not unstable, after which impliedly
plaintiff may return to California with her children to
to be with her husband.
By examing how this order works out in practice,
it becomes manifest that the first part of the order prevents plaintiff from meeting the requirements of the
second portion of the order. One can readily see how the
order itself places appellant in a grievous dilemma. She
must either stay with her children in Utah and establish
a home apart from her husband, or desert her children
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and go home to her husband in California. If she follows
the former course, she will not be in position to offer
any additional evidence that she has a stable home situation with her husband since she will not have lived
with him. If she follows the latter course of rejoining her
husband, it would rightly be said that she has more interest in her life with her husband than in her children's
welfare.
Can it conceivably be said that an order which creates such a situation is "reasonable and proper~" Can
it be said that placing the children where there is no
home for them and denying their going where there is
a home for them is in their best interests~ When a court
indulges in n1ere conjecture that there is a "possible unstable home situation," can it be said that this is the
exercise of sound

discretion~

To say the least, the trial court's order is not conducive to the establishment of a '"stable home situation"
if there were not one at the previous hearing. If plaintiff is motivated primarily by n1other love and remains
with her children, as she has done, how stable will the
home situation appear after January 1, 1959 (when plaintiff is permitted to reapply for re1noval) when the evidence is adduced that from the time of the last order
she has not lived in the same house with her husbandf
The trial court's order itself prevents the maintenance
of a stable home situation, and on the contrary is disrupting the home situation heretofore established.
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The effect of this order on the children can only be
harmful. The frustrations of their mother being forced
by the court order to live away from her home can only
be reflected in the children's environment. The instability
of the children being in a temporary housing situation
rather than becoming established in a permanent home
is certainly not in their best interest and welfare.
Divorces of couples with minor children cannot help
but have a deleterious effect upon the children. Unfortunately there does not appear to be any solution which
would be completely satisfactory in insulating children
from the unhappiness of their parents. When a divorce
becomes an accomplished fact, the role of a court should
be to make the readjustment which the children must go
through as easy as possible for them. Its province is
certainly not that of doing anything to further disrupt
the situation such as the trial court has done here.
It is submitted that given the factual situation of
a woman who has married a man whose professional
career dictates his residing outside the state of Utah, and
who has established a home in which the children can
be reared with their mother being able to devote her full
attention to providing them with a mother's loving care,
the trial court has needlessly injected a decidedly disrupting influence. The trial court's order will be a continual source of disruption so long as it is in effect, and
cannot, by its very terms, result in termination of this
dilemma.
As will be pointed out subsequently 1n this brief,
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the trial court made its finding of "a possible unstable
home situation" without any evidence whatsoever of anything but a suitable home situation. The court has withdrawn itself entirely from the evidence before it in arriving at this finding. If such a course were permissible,
it is altogether possible that the home situation of every
person in the nation could be declared to represent "a
possible unstable home situation.'' Certainly it is possible
to think of something in any person's background, personality, or behavior which, when equated with similar
or dissimilar characteristics in their spouse, could form
a foundation upon which we might conjecture that their
marriage might present a "possible unstable home situation." For the court to permit itself to indulge in such
conjecture, and to use this as the basis for an order such
as here is involved is certainly a most flagrant abuse of
discretion.
POINT TWO
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMOVE HER CHILDREN TO THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA DURING THE PERIOD FROM
SEPTEMBER THROUGH JUNE OF EACH YEAR, IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

The decree of divorce entered in March, 1958,
awarded the minor children to plaintiff's custody for
the period from September through June, inclusive, of
each year. This decree was not appealed fron1 by either
party and therefore is res adjudicata of 1natters occuring
prior to the hearing of the divorce action. In1plicit in the
award of the children's custody to plaintiff is the fact
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that the court found nothing in plaintiff's demeanor or
conduct as relates to the children which would make
her an unfit person to have their custody. In view of
the ages of the children, the girl six years and the boy
two years, this decision of the trial court was in keeping
with this court's ruling in the case of Hulse vs Hulse,
(1947) 176 Pac 2d 875, where it was said:
"This court has previously held in construing
40-3-5 of our statutes, that even in a contested
case where the husband is awarded the divorce, if
the children of the parties are of tender age, they
will ordinarily be awarded to the custody of their
mother, with provision being made in the decree
for the father to support those children."
See also: Anderson vs. Anderson (1946), 110 Utah 300,
172 Pac 2d 132; Holm vs Holm, 44 Utah 242,139 Pac. 937.
By its order of September 25, 1958, the trial court
again impliedly finds that the best interests of the children will be served by being with their mother.
Under these circumstances, the sole question then is
whether or not the trial court was correct in ruling that
the children should not be removed from the state of
Utah while they are in appellant's custody.
This court in the case of Griffith vs. Griffith, 18
Utah 98, 55 Pac. 84, adopted the rule that where the
circumstances justify it, the children of divorced couples
may be removed from the state. In that case the custody
of the children had been awarded to the mother. The
mother's parents resided in Iowa. The trial court had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ruled that the children could not be removed from Utah.
In reversing the trial court's order forbidding the removal, the court says:
"The defendant assigns as error so much of
the findings and decree as forbids the defendant
from taking her son beyond the limits of this
state. It appears from the evidence that defendant's parents reside in the State of Iowa, where
she lived until recently. Her welfare and the best
interests of the child might demand a return to
her parents and friends there, though outside of
the state. We are of the opinion that so much of
the findings, conclusions of law, and the decree as
forbids her from taking her son beyond the state
without the consent of the plaintiff, is erroneous."
The case of Kirby vs Kirby, 126 Wash. 530, 219 Pac.
27, involves a factual situation very close to that involved
here. An application to modify a decree covering custody
of a child was made to permit the mother to move with
the child to New York. The decree gave custody to
the mother at all times during the school year and to the
father during the summer vacations and one week at
Christmas time. The decree provided that the mother
could not remove the child from the jurisdiction without
the consent of the father or the order of the court. The
mother had remarried and her husband had a better
job opportunity in New York. The court reversed the
trial court's order refusing penuission to rmuove the
child from Washington, saying:
"In cases of this kind, the matter of first importance is the welfare of the child. If the stepfather can improve his business connections and
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associations, he treating the child as though it
were his own, a better business connection cannot
help but have a resultant beneficial effect insofar
as the child is concerned. The respondent has not
married since the decree of divorce, but maintains
a home with his two sisters, young women, both
of whom are employed a greater portion of the
time. If the decree is not modified permitting the
child to be taken to New York, it would result in
Mr. McCluske's remaining in Seattle when better
business connections would dictate his going to
New York, or that he would be required to maintain his family in the State of Washington, while
he resided in New York. This would be, in effect,
breaking up the family. Courts have not hesitated
to permit a parent, to whom a child has been
awarded in a divorce action, to take it to another
state, or even to a foreign country, when the best
interests of the child would be promoted thereby.
(Citing cases)"
This case was followed in the cases of Jeschke vs.
Jeschke, (1943) 16 Wash. 2d 617, 134 Pac. 2d 464, and
Goade vs. Goade (1944) Wash., 145 Pac. 2d 886. A similar ruling is to be found in Commonwealth Ex Rei Balla
vs Wreski, (1949) 165 Pa. Super 6, 67 Atl. 2d 595;
Wallace vs. Wallace (1910) 26 S. Dak. 229, 128 N. W.
143; Lane v. Lane (1945) Mo. App., 186 S.W. 2d 47;
Mattox vs. Mattox (1929) 129 Okla. 301; 264 Pac. 898;
Santo vs. Santo, (1949) Colorado, 206 Pac. 2d 341.
In examining the instant case in the light of these
rulings, certain salient points stand out. Without her
marriage to Dr. Scott, appellant would be required to obtain employment to provide for her support. As it is, she
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can now devote her full time and attention to providing
the children with a good home and in giving them a
mother's loving care and attention. By reason of her
marriage to Dr. Scott, a man who is able to provide
adequately for his family's needs, appellant can provide
the children with better facilities than she could had
she not married and was having to provide for herself.
The home into which the children will be placed
is a nice one in a good neighborhood which will provide
the children with very good surroundings. These factors
make it very decidedly to the best interests of the children that appellant has married Dr. Scott. To let state
lines interfere with this situation is rather pointless.
Dr. Scott has very definite advantages in his professional connections in California which dictate that he
should reside there. For the court by its order to force
a breakup of the home which appellant and her husband
have established for themselves and the children is erroneous and contrary to the decided cases on the point.·
The trial court has overlooked the ~1arch 17, 1958,
decree in making its ruling. It was clearly contemplated
in that decree that appellant would establish a residence
outside of Utah. All of the mechanical and other problems incident to having appellant reside outside the
state, such as getting children to and from the state, and
defendant's being able to visit the children, were carefully covered in that decree. It is submitted that the
requirement. of obtaining the court's permission for removal was inserted into that order for the sole reason
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that the court could determine that appellant would make
adequate arrangements for the care of the children in
establishing her residence outside the state. This she has
certainly done.
Nor is this a situation where the removal from the
state would deprive respondent from having the companionship of his children and being able to exert his influence and guidance over them. He has custody during
the summer months when the children are not in school,
and at times when he can spend more time with them. In
view of the difficulties which have occurred between
plaintiff and defendant in connection with the visitation
rights while the children have been in appellant's custody,
it is submitted that it will certainly be less disturbing on
the children that they do not experience fights and squabbles between their parents such as they have been subjected to since the entry of the March decree.
If the trial court's order is affirmed, it would require appellant to establish quarters for the children in
Utah for ten months a year, and spend ten months of a
year away from her home in California. From this
nothing is gained that would not be better accomplished
by the children's going to California with her where she
can make a permanent home for them for those ten
months a year and more adequately provide for them.
POINT THREE
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE FINDINGS CONTAINED THEREIN ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE HEARING OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION.
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In its order the trial court finds that "the remarriage
of plaintiff presents a possible unstable home situation
and time is needed in which to determine whether or not
the home of plaintiff and her new husband is suitable
for rearing the minor children of the parties hereto.''
This finding contained in the order is not supported
in any manner by the evidence presented to the Court.
There is not a scintilla of evidence to support any such
finding. On the contrary the entire evidence in the record
relative to the home and home life of appellant and her
husband reflects the very best of circumstances.
The court after finding "a possible unstable home
situation" without any evidence to support it, then proceeds from this premise to conclude that more time is
needed to determine whether or not the home of plaintiff
and Dr. Scott is suitable for rearing the children, following which the Court apparently concludes they should
then be removed to California.
It is submitted that this premise unsupported by
evidence of any kind is the basis upon which the court
has concluded the children should be kept by appellant
in the State of Utah for the present. Obviousl3T the Court
concluded that the children should remain in appellant's
custody, since that is its order. The onl~T basis upon
which it could have concluded that this custody should
not be in California with her husband was that expressed
by this unsupported finding.
It is submitted that the only element of instability
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which is to be found in the case at bar is that which is
the result of the trial court's order itself. The frustration
of a 1nother and wife torn between being with her children on the one hand and with her husband on the other,
and having no cause for this situation except that a
Court has decreed it shall be so, would certainly add a
substantial measure of instability to the most stable of
homes.
Further the Court in its Order requires that the
testimony of appellant's husband should be offered as a
condition to the granting of permission to remove in the
future. It is appellant's contention that the husband's
testimony is not mandatory in a hearing such as this.
The case of Aiken vs. Aiken, (1947) 120 Montana 344, 185
Pac. 2d 294, was a case quite similar to the case at bar,
where the mother, to whom custody of a minor child had
been awarded remarried a man in Colorado and requested permision to remove the child from Montana to Colorado. The trial court granted the permission, and on
appeal the father had contended that since the new
husband's testimony had not been offered, the trial
court's ruling was error. The Court in that case said:
"Here defendant is obliged to make her residence with that of her husband in Denver, Colo·rado. The court did not abuse its discretion In
authorizing her to take Russell with her. * * *
"The legal custody is with defendant and
not with her husband, and if her husband does
not properly treat the child, that might furnish
grounds for changing the custody in the future.
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but we think his silence cannot prevent the mother
who has the custody, from taking the child to the
state where she is obliged to live."
Appellant testified that Dr. Scott has a great amount
of affection for the children and desires to have them
come to California to reside with appellant and him. This
evidence stands unrebutted, and it is not the Court's
prerogative to specify how evidence shall be presented
to it nor what witness shall testify before it.
In conclusion, it is appellant's contention that the
trial court's order in denying appellant's motion to remove the children from Utah to California during the
period of her custody entitlement under the ~1arch 17,
1958 decree represents a gross abuse of discretion and
of itself creates a brutally impossible situation. The
trial court by both of its orders has found that the children should be with appellant during the period from
September through June of each year, and that such is
in their best interests. The cases which have been decided
involving the removal of children frmn one state to another have held that state lines can be no barrier incustody matters where the best interests of the children will
be subserved thereby. The Court has ignored the evidence
before it in determining that there is "a possible unstable
home situation", and has in fact pennitted itself to indulge in mere conjecture, when the evidence before it was
completely contran· to such a finding. In --riew of the
holding of the Court that the rnstody of the children
should remain with appellant, it becomes apparent that
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tiff and her husband have a good home for them in good
surroundings, than in the State of Utah where appellant
has no home, where any arrangements for the children
would be makeshift, and where plaintiff will be separated
from her husband.
It is respectively submitted that the order of the
trial court should be reversed and the appellant's motion
to remove the children from Utah to California for the
period of appellant's custody under the decree of divorce
of Th1arch 17, 1958, should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
STEPHENS, BRAYTON &
LOWE, and THOMAS C.
CUTHBER.T,
.Attorneys for .Appellant.
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